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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Michael Owen Perry of Lake Arthur, Louisiana, an unemployed oil-field 
roustabout with a history of repeated hospitalizations for mental illness and an 
obsessive interest in singer Olivia Newton-John, was an unlikely individual to call 
into question many of the fundamental underpinnings of modern forensic 
psychiatry.1  However, after his arrest in 1983 for murdering his parents, his 2-year-
old nephew and two cousins at point-blank range with a shotgun, the delusional 28-
year-old Perry became the center of a seven-year court battle over the appropriate 
role for psychiatrists in the administration of capital punishment.2  Although at 
various times Perry, who suffered from schizoaffective disorder, expressed his belief 
that he was God and that Ms. Newton-John was “a Greek goddess living under a 
nearby lake,” he was nonetheless found competent to stand trial and subsequently 
convicted of first-degree murder—despite a plea of innocent by reason of insanity.3   
                                                          
 1 John Mintz & Alfred E. Lewis, Man Arrested Here is Suspect in Five Slayings, WASH. 
Post, Aug. 2, 1983, at A1. 
 2 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. 1992). 
 3 Ruth Marcus, Justices Order State to Review Medicating Death-Row Insane; Louisiana 
Wants Inmate Competent for Execution, WASH. Post, Nov. 14, 1990, at A2; see also Man 
Accused of Killing Family Goes on Trial, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 1985. 
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The jury also found Perry responsible for “committing murders with the intent to 
inflict great bodily harm to one or more persons” in a manner “especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel” and recommended a death sentence.4  Judge Cecil Cutrer formally 
imposed this penalty on December 19, 1985.5  By that time, however, no psychiatrist 
could be found to declare Perry competent—a requirement for execution under the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright—and the question 
arose whether the anti-psychotic drug haloperidol might be administered, over the 
patient’s objections, to treat his active psychosis and render him fit for execution.6   
Perry’s predicament created a challenge for both his psychiatrists and the legal 
system.  If he were forced to take anti-psychotic medication—a demand his lawyers 
termed “Orwellian”—the psychiatrists who evaluated him stated that he might 
indeed be rendered sane enough to meet the level of competence required for 
execution.7  On the other hand, if Perry was permitted to refuse anti-psychotic 
medication, he would continue to live in a state of nearly perpetual psychosis in 
which, to offer just one example of his delusions, he believed that he had to shave 
his eyebrows to “let his brain breathe.”8  The question for the legal system was 
whether, under standards outlined in the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Harper v. 
Washington, Perry might be forcibly medicated without violating his rights under the 
Constitution’s guarantee of due process.9  Psychiatrists faced an equally challenging 
dilemma: Did medicating Perry, and thus indirectly making his execution possible, 
violate the canons of their profession’s ethics?10   More broadly, how complicit or 
entangled might psychiatrists become in the apparatus of capital punishment before 
such conduct became a censurable offense?  Judge L. J. Hymel of the Louisiana 
Criminal Court had initially ruled in 1988, prior to the Supreme Court’s Harper 
decision, that Perry might be forcibly medicated and executed.11  Perry appealed his 
own case all the way up to the United States Supreme Court—which sidestepped the 
issue and instructed the Louisiana State Supreme Court to review the case in light of 
the Harper ruling, even though the state’s highest court was already made in light of 
the Harper decision.12  The judges in Louisiana clearly recognized the message from 
                                                          
 4 Man Faces Death Penalty in Slaying of Five Relatives, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
November 1, 1985. 
 5 State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 545 (La. 1992). 
 6 Adam Nossiter, Paradox: Healing to Execute; Insane Man to Get Louisiana Rehearing, 
THE ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Mar. 17, 1991, at A1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 An Insane Remedy, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 1991, at 10A. 
 9 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-227 (1990). 
 10 David L. Katz, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row – Is Judicial  
Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 713-714 (1991). 
 11 The Cure That Could Kill, SAINT LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 3, 1991, at 2C. 
 12 Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990).  One likely explanation for the court’s one-
sentence remand in this case may be that recently-appointed Justice Souter had not heard oral 
argument and could not take part in the decision and that the court was deadlocked 4-4 on the 
issue and wanted a later vehicle to address the underlying issues once the court was 
functioning at full capacity. 
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above: Caught between their own past interpretation of Harper and the U. S. 
Supreme Court’s new order, they ruled that Perry had a right not to be forcibly 
medicated for execution under the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the 
state constitution, thereby avoiding the larger question of the rights of defendants 
under federal law.13  As a result, Perry’s sentence was to be stayed indefinitely until 
the government could demonstrate that the prisoner had “achieved or regained his 
sanity and competence for execution independent of the effects or influence of 
antipsychotic drugs.”14   This disposition fell short of that called for by the American 
Psychiatric Association in its amicus brief—namely, that Perry’s sentence be 
formally commuted to life imprisonment so that he might receive appropriate 
psychiatric care without any risk of placing his life in future jeopardy.15  At the same 
time, it opened the door for medicating Perry in the short term, and thereby spared 
both physicians and the state from grappling with the bind posed by his case.16  
However, the questions that had prompted the initial lawsuit remained unresolved.      
Three distinct sets of questions arose surrounding the Perry case, itself the 
product of simultaneous changes in the technology of capital punishment and in 
attitudes toward the death penalty that have increasingly placed the exigencies of the 
legal system on a collision course with the consensus opinion of the medical 
community.   The first of these questions was whether the United States Constitution 
protected condemned inmates from unwanted medical treatment—either corporeal or 
psychiatric—if receiving such care made them fit to be lethally injected.  The second 
question was the degree to which, under the canons of medical ethics, psychiatrists 
might participate in capital punishment.   While the specific issue in Perry was 
forcible medication, this represents just one of many points in the chain of 
complicity where a psychiatrist might be called upon to facilitate the process.  Even 
the act of testifying that a prisoner is competent and thereby executable under the 
Ford v. Wainwright standard is a form of participation, albeit remote, and the 
professional debate surrounding Perry left the ethics of various degrees of 
participation largely unresolved.17 (Another matter still unresolved is whether one 
might medicate a willing inmate to render him competent for execution—or whether 
doing so would actually be abetting a suicide—but that is a question beyond the 
                                                          
 13 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-749 (La. 1992); Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, 
Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana’s Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death Row Inmates to 
Choose Between a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 
1209 (1993); Court Says Killer Cannot Be Forced to Take Drugs for Sanity, N.Y. Times, 
Oct.21, 1992, at A21.  
 14 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747 (La. 1992). 
 15 Brief for the American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 1075 (1990)(No. 89-5120), 1990 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1053.  
 16 State v Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747 (La. 1992); Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State 
v. Perry: Louisiana’s Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces Death Row Inmates to Choose Between a 
Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1209 (1993); see 
also Lindsay A. Horstman, Comment, Commuting Death Sentences of the Insane: A Solution 
for a Better, More Compassionate Society, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 823 (2002) 
 17 See Paul S. Appelbaum, A Theory of Ethics for Forensic Psychiatry, 25 J. AM. ACAD. OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 233 (1997). 
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scope of this essay.)  Finally, the truncated resolution of the Perry case left entirely 
open the question of the impact that legal codes and social context might have on 
ethical norms in this area: If a certain degree of medical or psychiatric acquiescence 
in the execution process might be necessary to reduce a patient’s suffering, once 
execution had been unequivocally decided upon by the state, was such limited 
participation excusable or even desirable?  For example, might a physician ethically 
re-infuse an anesthetic or sedative during the execution process, after initial attempts 
by ancillary staff had failed, if a patient appeared to be in acute discomfort?  In short, 
this question asks to what degree existing practices and the existing legal regime 
may allow for exceptions to general ethical principles that govern the conduct of 
physicians in the area of capital punishment. 
The purpose of this paper is to merge two largely separate bodies of writing on 
the subject of psychiatric participation in capital punishment.  Much has already 
been written from the perspective of legal academics regarding the rights of 
prisoners to be free from unwanted medical care if the purpose of providing such 
care is to render them fit for execution.18 Medical ethicists have also written much on 
the degree to which physicians, and specifically psychiatrists, may participate in 
facilitating the death penalty before they become so complicit as to violate accepted 
standards of professional ethics.19 Surprisingly, these two fields of inquiry have 
developed in relative isolation.  What this essay seeks to do is to examine the 
relationship between these two bodies of thought and to explore the following 
question:  What impact do the ethical limits of psychiatric practice have on the 
application of capital punishment?  Two other questions naturally follow:  1) Do 
ethical limitations on psychiatric participation create a “bottleneck” that will, in 
practice, make executions impossible; and 2) Are there ways of meeting the 
constitutional rights of condemned defendants that would allow for execution 
without the participation of medical professionals?  In order to answer these 
                                                          
 18 See, e.g., Kelly A. Gabos, Note and Comment, The Perils of Singleton v. Norris: Ethics 
and Beyond, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 117 (2006); Rebecca A. Miller, Comment, The “Insane” 
Contradiction of Singleton v. Norris: Forced Medication in a Death Row Inmate’s Medical 
Interest Which Happens to Facilitate His Execution, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 659 
(2000); Sarah F. DePanfilis, Note, Singleton v. Norris: Exploring the Insanity of Forcibly 
medicating, then Eliminating the Insane, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 68 (2004); Ronald J. Tabak, 
Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 
25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283 (2006); Holland Sergent, Comment, Can Death Row Inmates 
Just Say No?: The Forced Administration of Drugs to Render Inmates Competent for 
Execution in the United States and Texas, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1299 (2004); Amir 
Vonsover, Comment, No Reason for Exemption: Singleton v. Norris and Involuntary 
Medication of Mentally Ill Capital Murderers for the Purpose of Execution, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 311 (2004). 
 19 See, e.g., Charles P. Ewing, “Dr. Death” and the Case for an Ethical Ban on 
Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing 
Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407 )1983); Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Ethics 
and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 37 (1986); Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, 16 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1986); Marianne Kastrup, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty, 14 J. 
MED. ETHICS 179 (1988); Alfred M. Freedman & Abraham L. Halpern, The Psychiatrist’s 
Dilemma: A Conflict of Roles in legal Executions, 33 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 629 
(1999). 
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questions, a brief exploration of evolving medical attitudes toward capital 
punishment is necessary. 
II.  PHYSICIANS & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
The controversy surrounding the role of physicians in capital punishment dates 
back to at least the 18th century Enlightenment, when French physician and death-
penalty opponent Joseph-Ignace Guillotin proposed a more humane method of 
execution, “a machine that beheads painlessly,” to replace the torture of the 
condemned upon the breaking wheel.20  In the years following American 
independence from Great Britain, Dr. Benjamin Rush became the public face and 
voice of opposition to capital punishment in the United States.21  His campaign to 
end executions as “contrary to reason,” launched from Benjamin Franklin’s front 
porch in 1787 and supported by many of his medical brethren, convinced the 
Pennsylvania legislature to prohibit executions for all crimes except first degree 
murder.22   By the late 19th century, physicians had become active participants in the 
national debate over which methods of execution were most humane.  For example, 
notable physicians dominated the New York State commission that in 1887 
recommended the prohibition of hanging as a method of killing.23  Three years later, 
New York State asked three nationally prominent medical men—Carlos F. 
MacDonald, the President of the State Board of Lunacy; George F. Shrady, editor of 
the Medical Record; and alienist Edward Charles Spitzka—to witness the 
electrocution of murderer William Kemmler and to ascertain that the first use of the 
electric chair proceeded smoothly.24   Yet Kemmler’s execution devolved into chaos 
when the condemned man started to breathe again after MacDonald and Spitzka had 
already declared him dead.25  Soon thereafter, Dr. Shrady spoke out publicly against 
the death penalty, writing that, “Although science had triumphed, the question of the 
humanity of the act is still an open one….We venture to predict that public opinion 
will soon banish the death chair…and that imprisonment for life will be the only 
proper punishment meted out to a murderer.”26  The debate over the merits of 
                                                          
 20 STEVEN MILES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE 72 (Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2004); see also Arthur Isak Applebaum, Professional Detachment: The 
Executioner of Paris, 109 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1995). 
 21 DAGOBERT D. RUNES, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 35-37 
(Philosophical Library, 1947). 
 22 James R. Archer, Capital Crimes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
153 (David Levinson ed., 2002). 
 23 Death by Electricity: The Substitute Recommended for Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
1988; Reform in Executions, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1888. 
 24 Kenneth Baum, “To Comfort Always”:  Physician Participation in Executions, 5 
N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 47 (2001); Dr. C.E. Spitzka, Alienist, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
14, 1914; The Kemmler Execution: Dr. C. E. Spitzka Tells Doctors and Lawyers All About It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1890; Dr. Shrady Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1907. 
 25 John G. Leyden, A Century of Executions, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1990, at D5. 
 26 Says It Is Barbarous: Dr. Shrady Doesn’t Like the Way Kemmler was Executed, CHI. 
TRIB., Aug. 8, 1890, at P2. 
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execution, and the appropriate role for physicians in the process, brewed for months 
after the Kemmler execution before the uproar abated.27  
During the first half of the 20th century, a handful of physicians gained 
widespread attention for campaigning against capital punishment, and the role of 
physicians in the process, most notably psychiatrist Lloyd Briggs, but it was not until 
the 1960s that Dr. William F. Graves returned the controversy to the center stage of 
professional and public opinion.28  Graves, a former physician at San Quentin 
Penitentiary from 1942 to 1954 who had participated in the executions of notorious 
killers Barbara Graham and William Charles Cook, refused to take part in any 
further executions after the death of Cook because he had concluded that doing so 
violated the ethical canons of his profession—making his the first documented case 
of an American prison physician refusing to participate in the administration of 
capital punishment.29   After his change of heart, Graves toured the country warning 
the public about the horrors of the death penalty.30  The ideas of men like Briggs and 
Graves paved the way for a second debate over the role of the medical profession in 
capital punishment, beginning in the late 1970s, which stemmed largely from 
changes in the material aspects of the punishment process.31   
 The role of physicians in the administration of capital punishment in the United 
States was rather limited until the late 1970s.  Ironically, efforts to abolish the death 
penalty led indirectly to an increased role for medical professionals.  At the time of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Furman v. Georgia (1972), which declared the 
existing regime governing the death penalty unconstitutional and ultimately led to a 
four year moratorium on the practice, the thirty-seven states that sanctioned 
executions relied upon four methods:  hanging, electrocution, lethal gassing and 
firing squad.32 Although several states required physician involvement in these 
processes, and all mandated a physician to confirm that death had in fact occurred, 
none of these methods of execution inherently demand a significant role for 
healthcare professionals.33  It was the shift toward lethal injection—a method first 
introduced in Oklahoma and Texas in 1977 because it was considered “less painful 
                                                          
 27 The Kemmler Execution: Dr. C. E. Spitzka Tells Doctors and Lawyers All About It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1890 
 28  Dr. Lloyd Briggs, Psychiatrist, 77: Reformer of Massachusetts Insane Asylum System 
Dies in Tucson Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1941 
 29 Dan L. Thrapp, Death Penalty Hit By Church Groups, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1955, at A4. 
 30 Ron Einstoss, Former Prison Doctor Decries Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1967, 
at P3; Paul Coates, The Death Penalty:  Our Society’s Indictment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1968, 
at B6. 
 31 This paper argues that changes in technology led to increased debate over the role of 
psychiatrists in capital punishment.  For an alternate approach, arguing that increased 
visibility of psychiatric discretion led to this increased attention.  See Gregg M. Bloche, 
Psychiatry, Capital Punishment, and the Purposes of Medicine, 16 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 
301, 301-357 (1993). 
 32 Execution Facilities Put to Unuse, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 2, 1972, at D33. 
 33 Arif Kahn & Robyn M. Leventhal, Medical Aspects of Capital Punishment Executions, 
47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 847, (2002). 
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and thus more humane”—that opened the door to a closer entanglement between 
physicians and the death apparatus of the states.34     
The preferred method of lethal injection in the thirty-eight states that eventually 
adopted this method of execution is administration of a three-drug cocktail 
containing sodium thiopental (to render the prisoner unconscious), pancuronium 
bromide (to paralyze the prisoner) and potassium chloride (to induce cardiac arrest).  
Dosing of these substances may prove challenging, and errors in dosing can cause 
severe suffering on the part of the inmate.35  Selecting an injection site, and ensuring 
that the cocktail is injected into a vein, as opposed to muscle tissue, is also essential 
if the suffering of the condemned is to be minimized.36  While lethal injection might 
theoretically be administered and supervised by a layperson, non-medical efforts 
have often led to unpalatable complications for the inmate and bad publicity for the 
state.  As a result, many states require the participation of doctors in the process.37 
Oklahoma’s pioneering statute, for example, initially required a licensed physician to 
inspect the equipment to make sure that it would flow into the prisoner’s veins and 
for a physician to pronounce the inmate dead.38  A “trained medical employee” was 
permitted to administer the lethal dose.39   Other states have also opted to have 
physicians train lay executioners, such as physician’s assistants, to conduct the 
injections.   
As states introduced lethal injection statutes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
American physicians for the first time argued that a collective stand against their 
participation in the process might be necessary.  When Texas passed its lethal 
injection statute in 1977, the state’s medical association became the first in the 
nation to restrict the role of physicians in executions, issuing a policy statement 
which warned that the only role an ethical physician might play in the process was to 
certify the death of the inmate.40  Soon afterward, Dr. Louis J. West of the University 
of California at Los Angeles called for a “national medical declaration that it would 
be unethical for a physician to lend his presence to an execution, even as an official 
examiner to certify the fact and time of death.”41  In 1980, attorney William J. 
Curran and cardiologist Ward Casscelles published a “Sounding Board” article in the 
New England Journal of Medicine that threw down the gauntlet on the subject of 
lethal injection.  After a thorough investigation of the moral dangers of physician 
                                                          
 34 William Curran & Ward Casscells, Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital 
Punishment By Intravenous Drug Injection, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226 (1980). 
 35 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, Justices To Enter the Debate 
Over Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007. 
 36 David Waisel, Commentary, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 1073, (2007). 
 37 See, e.g,. Nathan Crabbe, Executioner’s Qualifications Still in Doubt, GAINESVILLE SUN, 
Mar. 1, 2007. 
 38 William Hines, Ethics of Injection Killing Debated, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1980, at N4. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Philip Boffey, Experts Debate Ethics of Doctor’s Execution Role, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 1982, at A28. 
 41 Altman, Lawrence K.  Dead by Drugs for Criminals,  The Times-News, Henderson, 
NC, March 13, 1980. 
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involvement in this process, they concluded: “The medical profession in the United 
States should formally condemn all forms of medical participation in this method of 
capital punishment.”42  Within months, both the American Medical Association and 
the American Psychiatric Association, while noting that they were not taking a stand 
upon the morality of capital punishment, declared participation by physicians in the 
process to be unethical.43  According to the A.M.A. resolution, which relied upon the 
Hippocratic Oath’s dictum to do no harm, “A physician as a member of a profession 
dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so should not be a 
participant in a legally authorized execution.”44  The A.P.A. position statement, 
drawing a direct comparison to medical practice in Nazi Germany, stated that the 
organization “strongly opposes any participation by psychiatrists in capital 
punishment, that is, in activities leading directly or indirectly to the death of a 
condemned person as a legitimate medical procedure.”45  The following year, the 45-
nation World Medical Association called upon American physicians to refuse 
collectively to participate in the process.46  By 1982, when Texas executed Charles 
Brooks Jr. via lethal injection, the first actual use of this novel method, many of the 
medical profession’s leading bodies, institutions and individuals had spoken out 
against a role for their colleagues in the process.  However, no consensus existed in 
the medical community as to the degree of involvement that was permissible (e.g. 
Could a physician sign a death certificate?) or as to the appropriate sanction for 
participation.  Whether Dr. Ralph Gray, who had supplied the drugs for Brooks’ 
execution and examined him after his death, had violated the ethical standards of 
medicine was hotly debated—with the American Medical Association defending his 
limited role in the process.47  By the early 1990s, several states attempted to avoid 
any conflict with the medical establishment by reducing, as much as possible, the 
role that medical professionals played in executions.48  Oklahoma repealed its 
requirement that physicians supervise the process.  Texas enacted a rule that the 
death-certifying physician might wait outside the execution chamber until the 
warden has already pronounced the condemned prisoner to be dead.49  Other states, 
such as Illinois, continued to permit willing physicians to participate, but relied upon 
                                                          
 42 William Curran & Ward Casscells, The Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital 
Punishment By Intravenous Drug Injection, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED., 236, 230 (1980). 
 43 Ronald Kotulak, Execution by Injection: The Doctor’s Dilemma, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 12, 
1982, § 2, at 4; Position Statement on Medical Participation in Capital Punishment, 137 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 1487, 1487 (1980). 
 44 Betsy Glennon, Editorial, A Physician Is Not an Executioner: The Case Against Lethal 
Injection in Virginia, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1988, at B8. 
 45 Position Statement on Medical Participation in Capital Punishment, 137 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1487, 1487 (1980). 
 46 Doctors Oppose Execution by Injection, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1981, at 15. 
 47 Boffey, supra note 40. 
 48 Don Colburn, Lethal Injection: Why Doctors are Uneasy About the Newest Method of 
Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1990, at Z12. 
 49 Id. 
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registered nurses or “physician extenders” (i.e. specially trained technicians) in the 
absence of medical professionals.50      
A small minority of physicians continues to express support for the involvement 
of medical professionals in executions.  Some have argued that doing so makes the 
procedure as painless as possible for the condemned and avoids unnecessary 
suffering.51  As Dr. Carl Musso, an internist who assisted with executions in Georgia 
explained,  
We, as doctors, are not the ones deciding the fate of this individual…this 
is an end-of-life issue, just as with any other terminal disease. It just 
happens that it involves a legal process instead of a medical process. 
When we have a patient who can no longer survive his illness, we as 
physicians must ensure he has comfort.”52   
Other physicians have argued that a duty to the public safety outweighs any harm 
done to the individual patient under these circumstances.53  Recently, Michael Keane 
has done studies showing that failure to execute condemned murderers actually 
causes measurable brain damage in the surviving relatives of crime victims, 
suggesting that medicine may have a public health related duty to participate in 
executions.54  However, doctors who will agree to participate in executions are few.  
Those who are willing to advocate in the public forum for physician participation are 
even fewer.  State legislatures have not been quick to recognize this emerging 
consensus—and the result has often been conflict between the demands of the penal 
system and the ethical canons of the medical profession.   
This debate over the appropriate role for physicians in the lethal injection process 
came to a head in North Carolina in 2006.  The controversy originated in the case of 
Brown v. Beck, a prisoner’s challenge to that state’s execution protocol.55  The 
inmate in the case feared that the lethal cocktail might not ensure that he remained 
unconscious throughout the process.  In ruling against the prisoner, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina relied upon a state statute 
that required the presence of a licensed physician to monitor the inmate’s level of 
consciousness during the procedure and the belief that “the questions raised could be 
resolved by the presence of medical personnel.”56  In response to this ruling, and 
inquiries from member physicians, the state medical board issued a statement that 
physicians may not participate in any aspect of executions, and that doing so would 
                                                          
 50 Id. 
 51 Emma Marris, Will Medics’ Qualms Kill the Death Penalty?, 44 NATURE 8, 9 (2006).  
 52 Atul Gawande, When Law and Ethics Collide: Why Physicians Participate in 
Executions, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1221, 1228 (2006). 
 53 Neil Farber et al., Physicians’ Willingness to Participate in the Process of Lethal 
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subject them to disciplinary action.57  The result was a series of suits and countersuits 
between the medical licensing board and the state Department of Corrections, the 
ultimate results of which are still pending.58  Brown, however, will not benefit from 
the results as he was executed on April 21, 2006.59  Far more significant than the 
ultimate resolution of this case is the strong statement on the part of a medical 
licensing authority, in a conservative state with a lengthy history of support for 
capital punishment, that physician participation in the process amounts to an ethical 
breach worthy of license revocation.  The conflict is also significant because it 
suggests an indirect path to compete abolition of capital punishment:  If federal 
courts require physician participation for executions to proceed within the protective 
principles of the 8th and/or 14th Amendments, and state licensing boards refuse to 
permit doctors to do so, the result will be an impasse that prevents executions from 
taking place.  
What is clear is that a broad consensus has emerged over the preceding two 
decades that physicians should not participate actively in the administration of the 
death penalty.60  Bioethicst Arthur Caplan stood on solid ground when he recently 
wrote that nearly every major medical organization in the world has made clear its 
opposition to such participation.61  However, the degree to which physicians may be 
complicit in the process without transgressing ethical boundaries still remains 
uncertain.  Is training another individual in the basic principles of dosing and/or 
infusing, knowing that he will subsequently perform executions, itself a violation of 
ethical norms?  May physicians record vital data before or sign death certificates 
after lethal injections are administered?  The state medical licensing board of 
Kentucky investigated Governor Ernie Fletcher, a physician, in 2004 for merely 
approving death warrants in his capacity as governor.62  A group of physicians led by 
Dr. Arthur Zitrin of New York, who spearheaded the effort to revoke Fletcher’s 
license, has since filed complaints with numerous state licensing boards against 
physicians associated with the execution process in the hope of having the licenses 
revoked.63  The Moratorium Campaign, an abolitionist organization founded by 
Sister Helen Prejean of “Dead Man Walking” fame, has also made convincing state 
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medical boards both to prohibit physicians from taking part in executions and to 
revoke the licenses of those who do so one of their top priorities.64         
Among the most controversial debates in the evolving relationship between 
physicians and capital punishment is the degree to which physicians may use their 
healing powers on inmates in order to improve their health—even if doing so also 
makes them fit for execution.   At one extreme are cases where the state forcibly 
treats an inmate who has attempted suicide in order to preserve his life for the 
execution.65   In a particularly glaring instance, Robert Brecheen intentionally 
overdosed on sleeping pills within hours of his schedule execution, and Oklahoma 
prison officials insisted that doctors pump his stomach to render him fit for his lethal 
injection.66  In another case, death row inmate David Martin Long attempted an 
overdose with pills two days before he was scheduled to die, and Texas prison 
authorities had the prisoner flown from the intensive care unit in Galveston—on a 
ventilator and accompanied by a full medical team—to carry out his execution in 
Huntsville.67  More complicated are the cases of inmates whose execution may be 
months or years away.  No court has yet resolved the question of whether the state 
has a legitimate interest in reviving a condemned prisoner in spite of an otherwise 
valid “do not resuscitate” order or whether states may impose a simple course of 
antibiotics on a death row inmates.68   Similarly, no state licensing authority or major 
medical organization has staked out ground on these questions.  The difficulty in 
these cases, of course, is that the physician is not actually harming the patient 
physically, and may even be helping them under a narrow or short term 
understanding of the meaning of beneficence.  While the patient’s autonomy is 
certainly being overridden, since the state has apparently carved out a specific 
exception to generally-held notions of patient autonomy, much as it does with 
minors or the incompetent, it is not entirely clear that physicians who offer such 
“care” operate beyond the bounds of acceptable practice. 
The conflict becomes particularly challenging to negotiate where psychiatric care 
is concerned.  As Yale psychiatrist Howard Zonana, chairman of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Commission on Judicial Action, has argued, “If the 
prisoner needed an emergency appendectomy [in order to keep him alive for 
execution]…probably no doctor would have qualms about treating him, even against 
his will.”  However, the same reasoning does not necessarily apply to administering 
psychiatric medication.69   Moreover, even if the medical community could arrive at 
a consensus regarding the corporeal medical treatment of condemned inmates 
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against their wishes, in cases where the state had a vested interest in preserving their 
lives for future execution, it is not at all apparent that such a general rule should be 
applied to the forcible treatment of psychiatric illness in condemned prisoners, a 
subset of cases with its own unique and troublesome history.  In short, the 
appropriate and ethical role for psychiatrists in this field remains undetermined. 
III.  FORCIBLE MEDICATION:  FROM HARPER TO SELL AND BEYOND 
The question of forcibly medicating prisoners to meet the exigencies of the legal 
system, like the relationship of physicians to capital punishment, is one that emerged 
principally as a result of advances in technology—in this case psychiatric 
pharmacology.70   As early as 1960, the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States 
held that competence was required by the Constitution as a prerequisite for trying a 
criminal defendant.71  However, the development of more effective anti-psychotic 
medications over the subsequent decades was a necessary prerequisite for genuine 
controversy to arise as to whether treatment might be forced upon an inmate to 
render him or her fit for trial.  These cases compelled the courts—and the psychiatric 
profession—to assess what precisely was meant by serving the medical interests of 
prisoners.72  In a series of cases starting with Harper v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to answer the question of when and how a prisoner may be 
medicated against his wishes.73 
The inmate at the center of the first major case to address these issues, Walter 
Harper, had a long history of both violence and mental illness.74  He had been 
convicted of robbery by a Washington state court in 1976 and served four years in 
the mental health unit of the state penitentiary, where he was treated with anti-
psychotic medication.75  After his release on parole in 1980, he was civilly 
committed to a state mental facility.76  When he attacked two nurses at Saint Cabrini 
Hospital in 1981, his parole was revoked.77  Harper then initially agreed to return to 
his regimen of antipsychotic medication, but changed his mind in November 1982, 
when he expressed a belief that the medication, which included perphenazine, 
haloperidol and fluphenazine, was “poisoning his brain” and causing other side 
effects.78  From 1982 to 1985, Harper received such medication involuntarily.79  In 
                                                          
 70 Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotrophic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the Law 
and Beyond, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1243 (1990). 
 71 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960). 
 72 See generally Amanda Lee, Protecting the Inmate’s Right to Refuse Anti-Psychotic 
Drugs, 64 WASH. L. REV. 459 (1989). 
 73 See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 74 James H. Rubin, Court to Decide Inmate Rights on Anti-Psychotic Drugs in Washington 
State Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 6, 1989. 
 75 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 1990. 
 76 Id. at 214. 
 77 Rubin, supra note 74. 
 78 Court OKs Involuntary Medication, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb 27, 1990. 
 79 Dawn Weyrich, Court OKs Forced Medication of Mentally Ill Prisoners, WASH. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 1990, at A3; Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (Wash. 1988). 
2010] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, PSYCHIATRISTS 57 
 
February 1985, he brought suit in state court claiming a Constitutional right to be 
free from such involuntary medication and that, at a minimum, he was entitled to a 
judicial hearing (rather than a mere administrative hearing) to determine whether 
such medication was necessary.80  After losing at trial, Harper appealed directly to 
the Washington State Supreme Court.81  Harper argued that the state could not 
“override his choice to refuse antipsychotic drugs unless he ha[d] been found 
incompetent” and also if the fact-finder had made “a substituted judgment that he, if 
competent, would [have] consent[ed] to drug treatment.”82  The state high court 
agreed with Harper and held that psychiatric medication implicated a liberty interest 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.83  According to 
the state’s high court, the prison authorities had to demonstrate both “a compelling 
state interest” in medicating Harper and also show that the administration of the 
drugs was “necessary and effective for furthering that interest”—what amounted to a 
strict scrutiny standard.84  (Legal scholars have also suggested a first amendment 
right to freedom of conscience may be implicated in such cases, but this issue was 
not raised by Harper on appeal.85)  As significant federal questions were implicated 
by the case, the state of Washington then appealed the state court’s decision to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Mental health professionals were sharply divided over the state court’s ruling.86  
The American Psychiatric Association supported Washington’s appeal in an amicus 
brief that argued the benefits of the drugs far outweighed their dangers.87  In contrast, 
the American Psychological Association expressed its concerns over drugs that may 
“disfigure” and “disable” a prisoner long after he has been released.88  Their brief 
also noted that alternative interventions, such as psychotherapy, might be able to 
treat Harper effectively—without exposing him to the risks and side effects of 
antipsychotics.89  All parties conceded that the side effects of the drug regime to 
which Harper was subjected could be severe—including akathisia, parkinsonism, 
tardive dyskinesia, and sexual dysfunctions.90  On the other hand, such medications 
are widely used in psychiatric practice, and are viewed by many psychiatrists as far 
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more humane than continuous mechanical restraint or seclusion.91  Also at stake, of 
course, was the competing interest that the state had in maintaining order within its 
prison system.92  Implicit in such a need is an additional concern for the welfare of 
other inmates, many of whom fell under the care of the same psychiatrists charged 
with treating Harper.  The web of conflicting and parallel interests was complex.  
What should be apparent is that the controversy raised questions for both the courts 
and the treating physicians.     
The Supreme Court decided the legal questions on February 27, 1990.93  In 
writing for a five-member majority, Justice Kennedy upheld Washington State’s 
forced-treatment policy under a far looser standard than that demanded by the state’s 
high court.  According to Kennedy, “the extent of a prisoner’s right under the [Due 
Process] Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be 
defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement” and such requirements as the 
“medical finding” that “a mental disorder exists which is likely to cause harm if not 
treated,” and that two psychiatrists must concur on the need for treatment, were 
enough to meet such standards.94 Furthermore, an administrative review was 
acceptable to make such determinations; the Constitution did not require a formal 
judicial hearing to determine competence, once the prisoner was already legally 
incarcerated.  Two specific aspects of Kennedy’s decision are worthy of emphasis.  
First, Kennedy denied Harper the right to a formal judicial hearing in part because he 
feared that “expanding the rights of prisoners to a full judicial hearing” might “divert 
scarce prison resources, both money and the staff's time, from the care and treatment 
of mentally ill inmates.”95  Second, he relied heavily on previous Supreme Court 
rulings in the area of prison safety, such as Turner v. Safley (1987) and O’Lone v.  
Estate of Shabazz (1987) that had determined “the proper standard for determining 
the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional 
rights” was to inquire “whether the regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests’.”96  Kennedy held this to be true even when “the constitutional 
right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental.”97  The expansive nature of this 
finding seemed to suggest that, even if such medication were not found to be in the 
inmate’s personal or medical interest, it still might have been Constitutionally 
permissible to medicate an inmate forcibly.  In other words, while all of the 
safeguards offered by the state of Washington in Harper’s case helped to assure that 
the inmate was receiving care that complied with acceptable medical standards, 
Kennedy’s opinion opened the door to forcing care upon inmates under 
circumstances that did not meet such standards, if a “legitimate penological interest” 
were served as a result.  The precise parameters of this ruling were left unsettled.  
However, one has to suspect that no “legitimate penological interest” might have 
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justified medical interventions that would place a prisoner’s life or health severely at 
risk, but even this is not clear under Harper. 
The legal case, of course, is only half of Harper’s story.  Equally significant are 
the questions regarding psychiatric ethics raised by his suit.  While treating a 
psychotic prisoner with anti-psychotic medication is certainly not an ethical dilemma 
for the vast majority of psychiatrists, with the exception of anti-medication zealots 
such as Thomas Szasz, a more difficult quandary arises where the primary purposes 
of medicating prisoners serves the interests of prison security and order.98  While a 
full exploration of this difficult topic is beyond the scope of this paper, the question 
is worth noting, as it suggests that there are areas other than capital punishment 
where the penal system may permit forcible medication that may not serve the 
welfare of individual inmates.  For example, whether psychiatrists are ethically 
prevented from sedating prisoners for the sole purpose of transporting them from one 
prison facility to another, raises similar questions to those raised by complicity in 
capital punishment, only the stakes are far lower and the possible justifications far 
more reasonable.    
Returning to a legal analysis, it is important to note that one of the distinguishing 
features of the Harper case—in fact, one specifically noted by Justice Kennedy—
was that the prisoner had already been convicted.99  The Harper Court left open the 
question of whether forced medication was permissible when the state’s primary 
purpose was to render the prisoner fit to stand trial.  In such a case, of course, the 
inmate might have a competing interest in remaining psychotic—if doing so 
rendered in perpetually unable to face a jury.100  The Court eventually confronted 
precisely this quandary two years later in Riggins v. Nevada.101 
David Riggins was charged with the 1987 murder of Paul Wade in his Las Vegas 
apartment.102  Shortly after his arrest, the defendant informed the jail psychiatrist, Dr. 
R. Edward Quass, that he was hearing voices and having difficulty sleeping.103  He 
also informed Quass that he had suffered similar symptoms in the past that had been 
successfully treated with the antipsychotic thioridazine.104  The psychiatrist 
responded by placing Riggins on a notably high daily dose of 800 mg of the drug.105  
Riggins symptoms then abated and, shortly thereafter, two of three court-appointed 
psychiatrists found him competent to stand trial.106  At this point, Riggins decided 
that he wanted to plead not guilty by reason of insanity and requested 
discontinuation of the anti-psychotic medication.  His intention was not to render 
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himself unfit for trial.  Rather, he wished the jury to witness first-hand the 
psychiatric condition that he was in at the time of the murder.107  The trial court 
refused this request without explanation in a one-page order.  A Nevada jury 
subsequently found Riggins guilty of murder with a deadly weapon and sentenced 
him to die by lethal injection.108   The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Riggins’ 
appeal, and the United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari on the question 
of whether forcibly medicating a criminal defendant at trial violated his 
Constitutional rights.109  
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, chose not to answer the larger 
question of whether forcibly medicating a criminal defendant for the purposes of 
rendering him fit for trial passed constitutional muster.  Instead, she wrote that since 
Riggins “did not contend that he had a right to be tried without Mellaril if its 
discontinuation rendered him incompetent,” the question of “whether a competent 
criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication 
would render him unfit to stand trial” need not be addressed by the Court.110  The 
case tread significant new Constitutional ground, however, as O’Connor held that a 
14th Amendment right to due process did apply at the trial stage, as well as after 
conviction, she also wrote that the state did not have to meet a “strict scrutiny 
standard” to forcibly medicate a defendant.  Rather, showing that “medical 
appropriateness” justified such treatment was enough.111  Such appropriateness might 
mean that the forced medication was necessary for the “sake of Riggins’ own safety 
or the safety of others” and that no lesser means of achieving this end was 
possible.112   O’Connor also noted that the state “might have been able to justify 
medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it 
could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by using less 
intrusive means.”113  Note the use of the word “might.”  Fortunately for Riggins, the 
state had not attempted to make either of these claims, so the Court remanded for 
further fact-finding and adjudication under its newly announced standard.  The 
Nevada Supreme Court subsequently overturned Riggins’ conviction.114 
The question left unanswered in Riggins—namely, whether treatment might be 
imposed if the primary purpose of treatment was to render the defendant fit for 
trial—was finally addressed by the Court in Sell v. United States.115  Charles Thomas 
Sell, a St. Louis dentist, did not have the track record of violent or criminal conduct 
displayed by Harper and Riggins.  His initial indictment in 1997 was for mail fraud, 
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money-laundering and cheating Medicaid.   However, Sell had a long history of 
delusions, and his psychiatric state deteriorated while he was out on bail.116  After his 
bail was revoked in 1998, he was indicted for attempting to hire a hit man to murder 
the FBI officer who had initially arrested him and was charged with attempted 
murder.117  At this point, Sell petitioned the federal courts to reconsider his 
competency to stand trial and the presiding magistrate sent Sell to the United States 
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, for examination.118  
The magistrate subsequently found Sell unfit to stand trial.119  Two month later, Sell 
objected to staff efforts to medicate him on the grounds that it might render him 
competent for trial.120  Unlike in Riggins’ case, Sell’s goal here, at least in part, was 
to avoid adjudication.121   Both the reviewing district court and the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the state’s interest in medicating Sell outweighed Sell’s 
objections.122  As the district judge explained, the antipsychotic drugs were 
“medically appropriate” and represented “the only viable hope of rendering the 
defendant competent to stand trial” and thus the only opportunity “to serve the 
government’s compelling interest in obtaining an adjudication of defendant’s guilt or 
innocence of numerous and serious charges.”123  Sell appealed to the Supreme Court 
and certiorari was granted on the specific question of whether “the Constitution 
permits the Government to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a 
mentally ill criminal defendant—in order to render that defendant competent to stand 
trial for serious, but nonviolent crimes.”124     
The Court used Sell as the vehicle to answer definitely the questions that the 
Court had sidestepped in Riggins and to establish a rubric for deciding similar cases 
in the future.  Writing for the six members of the Court willing to examine the 
substantive issues in the case, Justice Breyer set up four requirements for forcible 
medication.125  These prerequisites were that “important government[] interests [be] 
at stake,” that the forcible medication would “significantly further [these]… 
interests,” that the medication was “necessary” to further these interests, and that 
such medication be “medically appropriate.”126  Several issues, however, remain 
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unclear.  First, what constitutes an offense serious enough to meet an important 
government interest is not spelled out; one of the circuit court judges, for example, 
did not feel that the fraud charges against Sell rose to this standard.127  In fact, 
Kennedy himself noted that courts “must consider the facts of the individual case in 
evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution.”128  In Sell’s case, for example, 
the accused had already spent more than four years in a government psychiatric 
ward—a longer period of time than he would likely have faced on the fraud charges.  
Unfortunately, whether this fact increases or decreases the case for forcible 
medication is not clear.129  Another concern is the difficulty of predicting whether a 
particular treatment is “significantly likely” to restore a defendant to competence, a 
determination that might be made with far more confidence after the fact.130  
Moreover, Kennedy does not translate “significantly likely” into a meaningful legal 
concept such as “more likely than not” or “beyond a reasonable doubt”—in short, 
leaving enough latitude to largely swallow the principle.      
The most significant puzzle left unsolved by the Sell ruling is the meaning of the 
requirement that treatment be “medically appropriate.”  One might assume that this 
was merely shorthand for serving the best medical interests of the patient.  However, 
Kennedy seemed to suggest in Sell that he intended a broader definition of medically 
appropriate—one that might include the duty of an ethical physician to serve his 
patient’s larger social interests, rather than merely his physical health.  Kennedy 
explained that the Sell test should be used as a last resort, when the Harper 
requirement of rendering an individual “nondangerous” was not relevant—because 
determining dangerousness is easier than determining the medical appropriateness of 
treatment.131  Kennedy wrote:  “The medical expert may find it easier to provide an 
informed opinion about whether, given the risk of side effects, particular drugs are 
medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient’s potentially dangerous 
behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the patient himself) than to try to balance 
harms and benefits related to the more quintessentially legal question of trial fairness 
and competence."132   What Kennedy appeared to be stating was that physicians are 
expected to make a determination regarding their patient’s interests based on the 
gestalt of the situation—and that this weighing of therapeutic, legal and social 
factors combined is what is meant by “medically appropriate.”  If this was 
Kennedy’s intention—and only further adjudication is likely to clarify the matter—
the test reflects a prescient recognition of the evolving relationship between the 
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medical community and the courts.  However, it offers psychiatrists no guidance as 
to what degree of drugging, and under what circumstances, actually does serve the 
interests of a patient like Sell.  For example, how one should weigh intermittent 
psychosis versus trial for fraud is a question that calls for a highly subjective answer 
that weighs multiple variables and values from various disciplines—everything from 
the odds of conviction at trial to the likelihood of recovery on antipsychotics.  Even 
an “expert” trained in criminal law, psychiatry, and moral philosophy would likely 
be at sea when faced with such a calculus.  At the same time, a decision regarding 
the disposition of cases like Charles Sell’s cannot be avoided.         
Sell explicitly left open the question of whether the Court’s ruling applied to 
cases where an inmate might be forcibly medicated for the purposes of execution.  A 
related question—also left unanswered, if not explicitly noted—was whether Sell’s 
findings applied to capital cases, in regard to competence for trial, where the Courts 
have historically exacted higher standards of process and certainty.  There are two 
separate yet related questions:  1) May a prisoner be forcibly treated for the purposes 
of trial in capital cases?; and 2) If convicted of capital murder, may such a prisoner 
be forcibly treated for the purposes of execution?  Yet if these are two distinct 
questions for the legal system, they also raise two separate sets of concerns for the 
psychiatric community.  While A.M.A. and A.P.A. guidelines are quite explicit on 
the subject of forcibly medicating prisoners for execution, the guidelines have not 
prohibited other aspects of participation in the trial phase of a capital case—
including, somewhat paradoxically, forcible medication for the purposes of 
adjudication.133  At the same time, it is not entirely clear that the determination of 
competence or even the rendering of the opinion in such cases that medication is 
psychiatrically appropriate, if the outcome may be execution, does not defy the 
professional duty of non-malfeasance.  Of course, before the medical community 
ever faces these questions, the legal system must determine whether such treatment 
meets Constitutional standards. 
IV.  FORCIBLE MEDICATION MEETS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
The forcible treatment of convicted criminals, like that of criminal defendants, 
obviously becomes a higher-stakes issue when the prisoner has been sentenced to 
death.  This is particularly the case since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ford v. 
Wainwright (1986), which upheld the common law doctrine that the insane may not 
be executed.134  The rule itself had been well established by the reign of Henry VIII, 
when Sir Edward Coke spoke of it as a cardinal principle of criminal law.135  
According to Coke, “By intendment of law the execution of the offender is for 
example…but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a miserable 
spectacle, both against law, and of extream [sic] inhumanity and cruelty, and can be 
no example to others.”136  Two centuries later, William Blackstone explained the 
rationale for the common law approach:    
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[I]diots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed 
when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself. Also, if a 
man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before 
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it: 
because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he 
ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall 
not be tried: for how can he make his defence [sic]? If, after he be tried 
and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not 
be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, 
execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the 
English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have 
alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.137 
Whether these principles still applied in the United States, after much of American 
criminal law had been codified, remained an open question when the Supreme Court 
ended its moratorium on executions in 1977.138   While several individual justices 
had stated in dicta that these principles did apply under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as early as the 1950s, it was not until 1986 that Ford v. Wainwright 
finally answered the question in the affirmative.  However, in doing so, the Court 
may have actually increased uncertainty surrounding the competency requirement 
for execution.139 
In many respects, the facts underlying Ford were not unusual for a death row 
case.  In 1974, at the age of twenty-one, Alvin Bernard Ford and three accomplices 
detoured en route to a cocaine-buy to rob a Red Lobster restaurant in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida; during his escape, Ford gunned down policeman Walter 
Ilyankoff.140  Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and sentenced to death.141  
Shortly after receiving his first stay of execution in 1982, which was granted twenty-
four hours before he was scheduled to die in the state’s electric chair, Ford appeared 
to suffer a psychotic break.142  By the time he had exhausted his state appeals nearly 
two years later, Ford’s psychiatric health had deteriorated to a state of perpetual 
psychosis.143  The inmate informed his jailers that he had “sent his mother, brothers 
and sisters to another planet on one of his space ships to ensure their safety.”144  At 
other times, Ford claimed that he had appointed nine new justices to the Florida 
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Supreme Court, bragged of having foiled a vast Ku Klux Klan conspiracy that 
involved taking 135 of his relatives and Senator Edward Kennedy hostage, and 
signed his letters to public officials “Pope John Paul III.”145  Neither Ford nor his 
state-appointed attorneys, who pursued his appeals even after he began demanding 
immediate execution in 1983, argued that Ford had been insane at the time of the 
murder or at his trial.146  Rather, they argued that his years on death row had 
rendered him insane and therefore unfit for execution.147 
The devil in the Ford case lurked in the details of Florida’s criminal procedure.  
State law did not permit executing insane prisoners and, in fact, had specific 
guidelines for addressing the question of the condemned inmate’s sanity.148  These 
guidelines instructed the governor to appoint a panel of three independent 
psychiatrists to evaluate the competence of the condemned and to report back to the 
chief executive—but did not allow for a judicial hearing on the question of sanity.149  
The standard to be used under Florida law was a determination whether “the 
convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death 
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him.”150  In Ford’s case, all three 
examiners concluded that Ford was indeed mentally ill, but that he was nonetheless 
capable of understanding the causes and consequences of his impending 
electrocution.151  Ford’s legal team, whose own psychiatric expert disagreed with 
these findings, demanded to present its evidence to a judge.152  So the question in 
Ford became not merely whether the federal constitution prevented the execution of 
the insane, but if it did so, what standard of due process was required to determine 
competence. 
Writing for a four-member plurality in Ford, Justice Marshall announced a 
sweeping rule that, without qualification, “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State 
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”153  He also 
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affirmed, for the first time, that the United States Constitution guaranteed 
condemned inmates a right to full due process to determine their sanity prior to the 
implementation of the death sentence.154   According to Marshall, this right entailed 
not only the opportunity to offer and impeach evidence, such as the presentation of 
testimony from psychiatrists other than the examiners appointed by the governor, but 
also a hearing within the judicial branch to determine sanity.155  Previously upheld 
state regimes that placed such determinations entirely within the hands of the 
executive branch, such as the one the court had sanctioned in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 
no longer sufficed.156  However, as Marshall could not find a fifth vote for this final 
portion of the opinion, the Court did leave a door open, per Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion, for an “impartial officer or board” housed within the executive 
branch to make the determination.157  As Florida’s statute did not even approach this 
standard, Ford’s case was remanded to the lower courts for further adjudication.158   
Ford received treatment for his psychosis and was eventually declared sane by a 
federal judge in 1989.159  He died of respiratory failure on Florida’s death row in 
1991 at the age of thirty-seven.160 
While Ford resolved one significant question, it raised several others.  The first 
of these was the threshold at which the right to a sanity hearing arose.  Marshall 
acknowledged that every condemned prisoner was not entitled to pro forma due 
process on the question of competence.161  He wrote:  “It may be that some high 
threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found a necessary means to 
control the number of non-meritorious or repetitive claims of insanity.”162  Yet both 
the quality and quantity of evidence required to surmount such a threshold—which 
has previously been left unresolved by the Court in Pate v. Robinson (1966)—
remained entirely unclear.163  For example, could the evidence of lay people trigger 
the right to such a hearing or was expert psychiatric testimony required?  Moreover, 
if psychiatrists refused to examine the condemned prisoner because doing so in a 
capital case might violate a perceived ethical duty of non-malfeasance, did the 
unavailability of experts shift the burden to prove sanity onto the state?  Also unclear 
was the permissible timeframe between the sanity hearing and the execution:  For 
example, would six months of additional appeals or a brief stay pending review by 
the executive branch then trigger the need for a repeat evaluation?  Yet by far the 
most important question left unresolved by the Court was precisely how much 
understanding the condemned prisoner had to have to meet the Constitutional 
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threshold for execution.  Justice Marshall’s standard—namely, that the defendant 
understood why he was to be executed—had not drawn a fifth vote from Justice 
Powell, who relied on a lower threshold of understanding the nature of the 
punishment and the state’s rationale for imposing it, so the Court did not speak with 
one voice on the subject.164  Moreover, even Marshall’s standard of “rational 
understanding” is rather amorphous. It was not until two decades after the Ford 
decision, in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (1997), that the Court sought to 
bring clarity to these areas of inquiry, and to offer the lower courts guidance 
regarding what specific rights it had intended to establish under the prior ruling.            
The sequence of events leading to the Panetti decision started in 1992 when a 
thirty-four year old unemployed veteran with a long history of mental illness, Scott 
Panetti, killed his in-laws and held his wife and three-year-old daughter hostage until 
being forced out of his cabin by a SWAT team.165  When Texas tried Panetti for 
capital murder in 1995, he sought to represent himself.166  The trial court ordered a 
psychiatric examination, which concluded that the defendant suffered from “a 
fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations,” but was nonetheless capable 
of mounting his own defense.167  Panetti was subsequently convicted, at a trial where 
standby counsel described his behavior as “scary,” “bizarre” and “trance-like,” and 
sentenced to death.168  Over the next nine years, his efforts to gain appellate review 
in the Texas state courts and at the United States Supreme Court proved 
unsuccessful, as did his claims for state habeas relief, and the trial court set an 
execution date of February 5, 2004.169  Only then did Panetti’s legal team assert that 
he was not competent to be executed under the standards established in Ford v. 
Wainwright.170  The Supreme Court accepted the case and used it to clarify three 
large gaps left by Ford—namely: 1) when a claim of incompetence for execution had 
to be raised; and 2) how extensive an assessment had to be conducted to meet due 
process standards, and 3) what level of understanding what required in order to carry 
out a death sentence.    
At first glance, the Panneti decision appears to have resolved much of the doubt 
left in the wake of Ford.  Writing for the “liberal” five-member majority on a highly 
divided court, Justice Kennedy first tackled the question of the timing of the 
incompetence claim.171  As a practical matter, he was compelled to address the 
question by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which barred 
“second or successive” habeas claims.172  In other words, all habeas claims not raised 
in a defendant’s initial federal appeal were considered waived.  However, Kennedy 
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noted that competence for execution did not fall under this standard, as a condemned 
defendant’s claim might not be “ripe” at the time of his first appeal. To rule 
otherwise, he pointed out, would create a legal catch-22 for prisoners like Panetti.   
As “all prisoners are at risk of deteriorations in their mental state,” at a first habeas 
hearing a prisoner would have either to “forgo the opportunity to raise a Ford claim 
in federal court; or raise the claim …even though it is premature.”  What Kennedy 
did not resolve was how close in time to the actual execution date such a claim might 
be raised and whether successive claims were permissible.  Similarly, the court left 
open several key questions regarding the extent of the hearing to which a defendant 
was entitled in order to meet the Constitution’s due process requirements.  Justice 
Kennedy interpreted Ford in such a way that Justice Powell’s concurrence was 
controlling.   As Kennedy paraphrased Powell’s standard, “Once a prisoner seeking a 
stay of execution has made ‘a substantial threshold showing of insanity,’ the 
protection afforded by procedural due process includes a ‘fair hearing’ in accord 
with fundamental fairness.”  At a minimum, this “fair hearing” requires “an 
opportunity to be heard” and to “submit evidence and argument from the prisoner’s 
counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State’s own 
psychiatric examination.”173  
The crucial holding of Powell in Ford, now described by the Court as “clearly 
established” law, is that the state could not rely solely on the evidence of its own 
experts to render a decision on the condemned prisoner’s competency.  However, 
Kennedy still left open the question of whether such a hearing required “opportunity 
for discovery or for the cross-examination of witnesses.”174  He also entirely ignored 
the possibility that psychiatrists sympathetic to Ford’s claim might also prove 
unwilling to evaluate him for fear of complicity in the apparatus of execution, a 
possible violation of ethical norms of their profession. 
The third and most important aspect of the Panetti case was that it sought to 
clarify the standard by which competency for execution was to be evaluated.  The 
defendant in this case acknowledged that he had committed the murders and also that 
the state intended to execute him; he even conceded that the state claimed that it 
intended to execute him for the murders.  However, he viewed this claim as a 
“sham” and believed that the state actually intended to execute him in order to 
prevent him from preaching.  The Fifth Circuit interpreted Ford to require merely 
that the defendant have an awareness of the state’s motive for executing him, not an 
understanding of it.   In other words, according to the appellate court, the delusional 
belief system of a schizophrenic patient like Panetti is not relevant as long as “the 
prisoner knows that the state has identified his crimes as the reason for the 
execution.”175  Justice Kennedy strongly rejected this standard as too narrow.  
Instead, what was required of the defendant was not merely a prisoner’s “awareness 
of the state’s rationale for an execution” but also a “rational understanding of it.”176  
However, as Kennedy conceded, “rational understanding” is a highly imprecise term.  
He noted that “some prisoners, whose cases are not implicated by this decision, will 
fail to understand why they are to be punished on account of reasons other than those 
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stemming from a severe mental illness.”177  While good reason might exist to 
distinguish psychotic patients from sociopathic patients or those with “amoral 
character,” as Kennedy did, that the Court did so without explaining its reasoning for 
this distinction lent less, rather than more, clarity to its standard.  Kennedy also 
stated that his ruling did not cover prisoners “so adept in transferring blame to others 
as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch with reality.”178  
Why such patients are different from psychotic patients, with regard to the ethics and 
policy basis of execution, remains entirely unclear.  In short, Panetti has left the 
lower courts with even less guidance on what exactly constitutes competence for 
execution.  As Paul Appelbaum saliently noted in the wake of the Panetti decision, 
“there seems little question that in the future the issue of when a prisoner is 
incompetent to be executed will again make its way to the Supreme Court for a 
definitive ruling.”179 
The need for clarity acquires added importance when the issues of competence 
for execution raised by Ford and Panetti meet the issues of forcible medication 
addressed in Sell.  After the Court chose not to resolve question at the nexus of these 
cases (namely, the forcible treatment of psychiatric defendants to render them fit for 
execution) in Perry, a series of similar quandaries emerged in various states.   The 
dilemma was not merely whether forcibly medicating for the purpose of execution 
was constitutional, but also, if it were not, what the appropriate remedy might be.  
On the one hand, the trial courts might allow the condemned to remain in a state of 
psychosis.   Alternatively, the state might commute or vacate the inmate’s death 
sentence and then medicate him—the position favored by the American Psychiatric 
Association.  As is not surprising, jurisdictions varied in their approaches.  For 
example, South Carolina’s Supreme Court established a right not to be forcibly 
medicated for execution under the state constitution in Singleton v. State, but overtly 
rejected a lower court judge’s effort to permanently commute the defendant’s 
sentence.180  Writing for a unanimous state court, Justice Toal noted that the trial 
judge was mistaken in his belief that no cure for Singleton’s illness was possible.  As 
Toal explained, “Perhaps under the scope of our current psychological knowledge, 
this is true; but there is always a potential for change. To carve out a remedy which 
ignores the ebb and flow of medical science is to create a rule which potentially 
could be impossible to live with in years to come.”181 In contrast, the Maryland 
legislature annotated its penal code to automatically commute the death sentence of 
anyone found incompetent for execution, thus ensuring that such prisoners might 
receive appropriate treatment for their illnesses.182  These various approaches, and 
the forceful objection of the A.P.A. to medication for execution, meant that it was 
only a matter of time before a case arose that forced the federal courts to address the 
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issues at the nexus of forcible treatment and capital punishment, which the Supreme 
Court had skirted in Perry.  The vehicle for potentially resolving these issues was the 
Arkansas case of Singleton v. Norris—a case that shared nothing except a similar 
name and a similar fact pattern to South Carolina’s Singleton v. State. 
Charles Laverne Singleton was convicted of stabbing to death Mary Lou York 
during a robbery of her Hamburg, Arkansas, grocery store in 1979.183  The evidence 
against Singleton was “overwhelming,” including positive identification by the 
dying woman, and several witnesses who knew both the defendant and victim.184  He 
later confessed to the crime.185  However, after his conviction, Singleton was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia.  The catch in Singleton’s case was that his psychotic 
symptoms abated after the state had deemed him a threat to himself and others and 
had placed him on anti-psychotic medication in 1997.  Singleton accepted that 
forcibly medicating him was permissible under previous Supreme Court rulings, 
such as Harper v. Washington, as long as it was in his “best medical interests.”  
However, he claimed that “it becomes illegal once an execution date is set” because 
it no longer serves such purposes.  Unfortunately for Singleton, the Eighth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, adopted a very constricted view of the “best medical interests” 
standards.  Chief Judge Roger Wollman distinguished between Singleton’s short-
term medical interests, which favored the drug regime, from his long-term interests, 
which, as they rendered him fit for execution, might not.   According to Wollman, if 
the forced treatment served Singleton’s short-term medical interests, then that would 
be enough to meet the Harper standard.  
Many court watchers believed that the Supreme Court would use Singleton to 
address the question that they had explicitly left unanswered in Sell, where Justice 
Breyer had noted that, unlike in most forcible medication cases, an entirely different 
case is presented when the government wishes to medicate a prisoner in order to 
render him competent for execution.186  Inexplicably, the Supreme Court refused to 
grant certiorari.   Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas subsequently denied 
clemency and Singleton, his appeals exhausted, was executed by lethal injection on 
January 6, 2004.187  As of 2009, no other circuit court has yet to address this 
question.  As a result, the law of the land regarding forcible medication for 
execution, left open by the Court in Sell, remains unclear.  However, the questions of 
Constitutionality should not be conflated with those of medical ethics.  It does not 
follow that, just because the state may legally impose medication upon a prisoner to 
render him fit for execution, a medical professional may facilitate the administration 
of the drug regime.  Much like in the sixties protest mantra captured in the title of a 
Tony Curtis movie, “Suppose They Gave a War and Nobody Came,” one must 
consider what would happen to the state capital punishment regimes if all medical 
professionals, including psychiatrists, refused to address issues of competency, at 
                                                          
 183 Emmett George, Death Row Inmate Apologizes for Slaying, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, 
Feb. 6 1999, at B8. 
 184 Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d at 181. 
 185 George, supra note 183. 
 186 Linda Skatter, Supreme Court refuses appeal of Arkansas death-row inmate, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 2003; Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 187 Traci Shurley, Singleton Dies, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 7, 2004. 
2010] CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, PSYCHIATRISTS 71 
 
any stage of the proceedings, on ethical grounds.  As with nearly all questions under 
our federal system, the practical result of such collective action would differ 
significantly by state.     
V.  PSYCHIATRISTS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE STATES 
The states vary greatly in the degree to which they require the participation of 
physicians and psychiatrists to conduct their capital punishment regimes.  However, 
the rules of the states can be broadly divided into three categories:  those whose 
statutes specify a role for physicians and/or psychiatrists, those whose statutes seem 
to require a role for physicians and/or psychiatrists without explicitly stating so, and 
those states that overtly exclude a role for physicians and/or psychiatrists to the 
degree that such exclusion is Constitutionally permissible.  Ironically, the three state 
cases that this paper has examined in depth—Riggins, Harper, and Perry—offer 
paradigmatic examples of these three possible approaches.  Most other states use 
variations upon these regimes.  A detailed comparison of the various state regimes, 
both between and within these general models, would be highly informative, but 
requires a focus well beyond the scope of this paper.   
A.  Nevada 
The sections of Nevada’s criminal code dealing with capital punishment rely 
upon the participation of medical professionals in numerous ways.  For example, the 
Director of the Department of Corrections must invite both “a competent physician” 
and a “psychiatrist” (the statute makes a distinction between the two that seems to 
suggest that these are mutually exclusive) to witness the execution.188  The statute 
guarantees an opportunity for DNA analysis that may require the employment of a 
medically trained professional to remove and later examine a biological sample.189  
The statute also requires the participation of physicians to determine whether the 
condemned inmate is pregnant.190  One should note that a determination of 
pregnancy is not inherently a medical determination—a midwife, a technician or 
even a layperson could likely make such determination—but Nevada has chosen to 
require three physicians to take part in the evaluation.   
The Nevada statute also specifies a role for psychiatrists in the evaluation of a 
condemned inmate’s sanity.  If the Director of the Department of Corrections has “a 
good reason to believe” that the prisoner has become insane prior to execution, a 
judge shall arrange a hearing before two psychiatrists, two psychologists or a 
psychiatrist and a psychologist.191  The threshold for invoking such a hearing is 
unclear.  The statute makes no provision for circumstances in which no mental 
health professional can be found to conduct the evaluation.  However, one can 
reasonably assume that once the Director has expressed to the trial court a belief that 
a prisoner has crossed such a threshold, the unavailability of psychiatric evaluators 
would place a de facto hold on the death penalty process.  In this regard, Nevada 
relies heavily on the complicity of medical professionals in conducting executions. 
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B.  Washington 
Washington state’s capital punishment regime appears to depend on the use of 
physicians in a limited way, but not nearly as extensively as does Nevada’s.  For 
example, there is no provision in the Washington penal code for physicians or 
psychiatrists to witness executions.192  The only overt mention of a role for 
physicians in the Washington code appears to be the requirement that “death shall be 
pronounced by a licensed physician.”193  However, the state of Washington does have 
provisions for determining competency at trial—rules that, in the wake of Ford v. Wainwright, 
appear to apply to competence for execution as well.  What is most striking about 
Washington’s rules governing competency trials is that they call for the appointment of “two 
qualified experts or professional persons” to make determinations of competence.194  Nowhere 
in the statute is there any requirement that these be medical or even mental health 
professionals, so in theory, a social worker or even a legal expert trained in such matters might 
pass muster.  It is true that Washington’s courts have consistently assumed that these 
individuals will be medically trained—without every formally imposing such a 
requirement.195  At the same time, the courts have left trial judges with broad discretion in 
matters of competence—far more so than in most states, including Nevada—so it is not at all 
clear that a trial judge might not qualify a non-medically trained individual as an expert under 
Washington law.196  The bottom line is that while Washington law does depend upon 
physicians and psychiatrists in its capital punishment regime, its statutory law is constructed 
in such a way as to leave the door open to the continued operation of the system even if 
medical professionals refused to take part.   
C.  Louisiana  
Louisiana appears to exclude physicians and psychiatrists, as much as is feasibly 
and constitutionally possible, from its capital punishment regime.  For example, the 
Louisiana statute overtly states that a physician need not be present for the 
execution.  Similarly, with regard to female prisoners, the code states that the 
“execution of a female who has been clinically diagnosed as being pregnant shall be 
suspended”—but does not require that a physician make such a determination.197   
The only obligation with regard to competence, beyond those imposed by the federal 
Constitution, is the provision that the trial court “shall order a mental examination of the 
defendant when it has reasonable ground to doubt the defendant's mental capacity to 
proceed.”198  It is not at all clear that any experts—medical or otherwise—are required under 
the statute.  Louisiana appears to be one of the few states where questions of competence, in 
theory, might be determined entirely by the trial judge.  As a result, it is possible that even 
without the participation of medical professionals, the state’s capital punishment system might 
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be able to function.  Of course, whether or not such a system would meet the standards of the 
federal Constitution without the participation of physicians is an entirely different matter. 
F.  Implications 
If evolving standards of medical ethics compelled medical professionals, 
including psychiatrists, to opt out of the capital punishment system, the impact 
would be felt immediately in states like Nevada and California, which rely heavily 
upon their participation, while the statutory regimes in states like Louisiana and 
Oklahoma might survive—at least until confronted with the federal constitutional 
issues raised in Ford and Harper.   Of course, it is not clear that psychiatrists should 
remove themselves from the system in such a manner.  The degree to which 
participation by psychiatrists in the various aspects of these state capital punishment 
regimes is ethical depends in part on the theoretical underpinnings of the opposition 
to participation voiced by various professional associations and opinion leaders.  
While a complete survey of the reasons favoring and opposing such participation is 
available elsewhere, and is unlikely to clarify the relationship between legal and 
medical thinking on these issues, a brief analysis of the controversy as it relates to 
the question of how much entanglement is too much entanglement may be helpful at 
this juncture. 
VI.  A ROLE FOR PSYCHIATRISTS?  
A.  Philosophical Underpinnings to Opposition 
There are at least three sets of distinct reasons advanced by opponents of 
psychiatric involvement in capital punishment.  The first of these stems largely from 
duties toward the specific patient who faces execution.  The second set of objections 
arise in the context of the medical profession and the public consequences of 
entangling the practice of medicine with the machinery of execution.  Finally, a third 
set of objections arises regarding the possible moral duty of physicians and 
psychiatrists to object to practices that increasingly defy international norms 
regarding human rights.  Each of these objections merits discussion, as the 
underlying reason one opposes physician involvement in capital punishment may 
help clarify the degree to which psychiatrists may participate in the process. 
The most frequent objection raised to physician participation in capital 
punishment is that medical professionals have a duty to serve the medical needs of 
their patients.  Several questions immediately arise:  1) Are the individuals being 
evaluated by forensic psychiatrists in capital cases truly “patients” in the traditional 
sense of the doctor-patient relationship?  2) Does an ethical approach to these cases 
require the psychiatrist to take a broad view of harm that encompasses the social 
consequences of treatment (i.e. execution) or only a narrow view of harm that 
restricts itself to the medical aspects of care?  These questions, which reflect many of 
the fundamental debates underpinning forensic psychiatry, have been explored 
extensively in the literature of psychiatric ethics.199  Some commentators, such as 
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Alan Stone, have argued that treating forensic patients as distinct from other patients 
or interpreting the principle of non-malfeasance narrowly undermines the basic 
tenets of ethical medical practice.200  Others, notably M. Gregg Bloche, have noted 
that Stone’s seemingly rigid take on psychiatric ethics ignores the “awkward reality 
that adverse extra-clinical consequences of clinical work are pervasive in 
contemporary life” and that these objections do not merely challenge forensic 
practice, but are largely unworkable in the context of modern medical practice.201  It 
is important to note that if one accepts the “do not harm principle” as the reason for 
opposition to physician participation in capital punishment, then it logically follows 
that the more likely a physician’s actions are to increase the likelihood of execution, 
the more difficult they become to defend.  However, even this principle may provoke 
more questions than it answers.  For example, an individual physician testifying on 
behalf of a capital defendant might, on first glance, appear to be acting in an ethical 
manner because such conduct reduces the likelihood of execution.  However, if all 
physicians opted out of the process, the machinery of capital punishment might grind 
to a halt, so such participation on the behalf of the defendant might actually have the 
paradoxical effect of increasing the likelihood of execution—not merely at a 
systemic level, but for the specific defendant as well.  Needless to say, the 
application of “do no harm” in such cases is not intuitive—even to the most well-
intentioned physician and even to the physician who opposes capital punishment.    
A second set of objections argues that the challenges of physician involvement in 
capital punishment extend far beyond any conflicts of interest in the physician’s 
relationship with his or her individual patients.  Instead, the concern here is that a 
perceived conflict of interest will undermine the confidence of both individual 
patients and the general public in mental health professionals.  An analogy can be 
drawn to the debate over physician-assisted suicide, in which some commentators 
argue that whether the practice is legalized, medical professionals should not be 
involved—because the involvement of physicians compromises the trust that 
patients may have in them.202  The damage here is systematic or structural, rather 
than to any specific criminal defendant.  Rather, all criminal defendants—and maybe 
other psychiatric patients—will doubt the loyalties of their mental healthcare 
providers.  Of course, psychiatrists have been participating in capital punishment 
regimes in limited and indirect ways for many years, and it is not clear that doing so 
has undermined trust in the profession.  What is significant about this objection to 
physician involvement in capital punishment is that it does allow for gradations of 
participation.  If the concern is the appearance of entanglement, rather than the 
specific effect on death row inmates, then the judgment becomes one of degree 
rather than an all-or-none proposition.   
Finally, the third set of objections to physician involvement in capital 
punishment relies upon the principle that the death penalty is a violation of evolving 
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standards of international human rights.203  The United States remains one of only a 
handful of Western democracies that permits state-sanctioned executions; the 
European Convention on Human Rights speaks unequivocally on the subject.204  
Unlike objections on either non-malfeasance or professional welfare grounds, this set 
of objections does not oppose only physician involvement in capital punishment, but 
presumably the practice as a whole.  If an ethical duty to work toward abolition—or 
at least not to stand in the way of abolition—is the reason for such a proscription, 
then the consequences for the degree of permissible involvement are far more 
drastic.  When bearing witnesses is the goal, it is not even clear that participation that 
reduces the likelihood of particular executions is permissible.  A reasonable 
comparison might be drawn to a jurist in an oppressive state who continues in his 
duties in order to meet out more lenient punishments than his believing colleagues.  
To phrase the matter candidly:  If one truly believes that capital punishment is a 
violation of basic human rights, then any participation in a system that utilizes it—
possibly even any work as a forensic psychiatrist in the American legal system—
might be unethical.  Leaving that question unanswered, it remains safe to state that 
the reasons one opposes physician participation in capital punishment are 
inextricably linked to the degree of involvement that one will ethically tolerate.      
B.  How Complicit is Too Complicit? 
There are multiple places along the path to execution that psychiatrists may be 
called upon to participate in the legal process.205  While the A.P.A. and many other 
professional organizations have issued policy statements on the subject, the 
psychiatric community is highly divided over what stage, if any, such participation is 
appropriate.206  Among those ways in which a psychiatrists might be called upon to 
participate are:  1) in determining that an inmate is fit to stand trial in a potential 
capital case; 2) in medicating an inmate to stand trial in a potential capital case; 3) in 
offering testimony at the trial phase in a capital case; 4) in offering testimony at the 
sentencing phase in a capital case; 5) in finding an inmate competent to be executed; 
6) in medicating an inmate for execution; and 7) in determining that a prisoner has 
indeed died and/or in signing a death certificate.   Many other incidental ways 
inevitably exist, too varied to enumerate, in which a psychiatrist might also become 
tangentially involved in the mechanism of execution—everything from sedating a 
prisoner for transportation to a capital trial to certifying that the presence of the 
defendant in the courtroom does not pose a safety hazard.  Finally, although not 
unique to psychiatrists, the participation of any medical professional in a supervisory 
role might also raise ethical concerns.   One Washington state physician, Marc F. 
Stern, recently resigned from his position as medical director of the state’s 
corrections department, where he supervised more than seven hundred health 
professionals, when he discovered that medication from the facility’s dispensary had 
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been used in an execution.207  Obviously, such an approach can be advocated or 
adhered to ad absurdum.  In theory, one might argue that any participation by 
psychiatrics in the judicial or penal systems of a state that permits executions is itself 
indirect complicity in the process, as a strict abolitionist might (see above), but the 
reality is that opting out of these systems en masse would likely do far more harm 
than good to mentally ill prisoners.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that such drastic 
action is necessary, as argued below, in order to so extricate medical professions 
from the process that executions cannot take place.  
What is most striking about the approach of various professional organizations to 
the question of the ethical boundaries of physician participation in execution is how 
different they are in the conclusions that they have reached.  The American Medical 
Association, for example, prohibits involvement in the execution process, such as 
forcible medication, but not in determinations of competence for execution.  In 
contrast, a panel of the British Medical Association has advised that neither 
testimony regarding competence nor medicating for execution is permissible.208  
Other groups have argued that any post-conviction involvement by psychiatrists 
violates the canons of professional ethics.209  The reality is that all of these 
distinctions prove as arbitrary as they are convenient.  Assuming that non-
malfeasance is the principal ethical concern, a better standard would be a proximate 
cause or “but for” test that asks, “Does the participation of a psychiatrist in this case 
increase the likelihood of execution?”210  If the answer is yes, and the reasons noted 
above regarding non-malfeasance are accepted by the profession as to why 
psychiatric participation in executions is unethical, then the logical result is that 
psychiatrists must opt out of all matters relating to a specific capital defendant.  Such 
an approach may substantially reduce the workload, and possibly the reimbursement, 
of forensic psychiatrists, and may substantially impede the capital punishment 
regimes of the states, but none of these are valid concerns to override strong ethical 
duties. 
C.  Toward a Zero-Tolerance Rule? 
If the underlying reason that physician participation in executions is unethical is 
that it ultimately does not serve the interests of the patient, then it follows logically 
that any act by psychiatrists in the course of their professional duties that increases 
the likelihood that a patient they have examined will be executed is unethical.   The 
objection might be raised that refusing to participate does not reduce the likelihood 
of execution, because the state will simply find another psychiatrist to serve its 
purposes.  In reality, the member of the psychiatric profession willing to participate 
might be more sympathetic to the state—not an unreasonable surmise—and thus the 
act of refusing to participate by the original psychiatrist might actually have the 
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paradoxical result of increasing the likelihood of execution.211  However, this 
reasoning only applies if psychiatrists act individually.  While the personal choices 
of physicians in this area might not have a mitigating effect on executions, if all 
psychiatrists were prohibited from doing so by licensing authorities, then the refusal 
of individual physicians to participate would effectively shut down the process as it 
now exists, at least in most states.   If capital punishment were to continue at all, it 
would have to do so under a new set of rules that did not require the participation of 
psychiatrists.  (A rough comparison might be drawn to the Adolph Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem, where special provision had to be made for the war crimes defendant to 
acquire a German attorney, as no member of the Israeli bar was willing to handle the 
accused war criminal’s case.)  The key to such collective action would be a blanket 
and uniform prohibition that prevented psychiatrists from facilitating capital 
punishment in any direct or indirect manner—from declaring prisoners fit to stand 
trial in capital cases through rendering them fit for execution.  The ultimate result 
might be a “bottleneck” in which the rules of the psychiatric profession prevent any 
capital punishment regime from complying with the Constitutional demands 
required for execution.  To state the matter directly, if the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in cases such as Ford and Sell stands, it may be impossible, as a practical 
matter, to maintain any working death penalty system without at least the limited or 
indirect participation of some psychiatrists.  As a result, psychiatry may succeed 
where teams of defense lawyers and advocacy groups have failed, in imposing a de 
facto moratorium on executions. 
VII.  CONCLUSION:  A POST-PSYCHIATRY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REGIME? 
The question that remains unanswered is whether the Constitutional requirement 
of due process can be achieved without the participation of psychiatrists.212  Let us 
take the hypothetical example of a future situation, not entirely implausible, in which 
American Psychiatric Association guidelines and state medical board policies will 
dictate that all involvement in capital cases by medical professionals is unethical.  
Such a broad principle would not only prevent determination of competence for 
execution—but also determination of competence for trial in situations where the 
death penalty was a possible outcome.  The obvious consequence would be that no 
defendant would then be able to provide expert evidence strong enough to invoke the 
threshold required by Harper for a hearing on sanity to take place.   How might 
courts respond?  One possibility is that they would allow lay evidence, such as 
testimony from friends and family, to be evaluated by trial courts without the benefit 
of psychiatric input.  The judiciary itself would then assume the responsibility of 
assessing the competence of defendants.  Of course, the challenges of equipping the 
court system to make such determinations, which now rely upon the expertise of 
trained professionals, are readily apparent.  Whether they are insurmountable—either 
practically or constitutionally—is a different question.  However, if evolving 
                                                          
 211 See, e.g. James C. Beck, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty, HARV. REV. OF PSYCHIATRY 
225, 225-29 (1996) (stating that psychiatrists willing to testify in capital cases are more likely 
to present evidence favoring the prosecution). 
 212 Starting with Solesbee v. Blackom, 339 US 9 (1950), the court has assumed a role for 
physicians (and usually psychiatrists) in the process, and has not confronted any state statute 
that allows determinations of competence without the participation of a psychiatrist, so this 
question remains entirely unresolved. 
78 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:45 
 
medical standards continue to diverge from current legal practice, such a 
psychiatrist-free capital punishment regime may be the final refuge of defenders of 
the death penalty. 
 
